We examine stock market returns around periods of increased naked short selling with two objectives in mind. First, we study persistent failures to deliver (FTDs) for insight into naked short sellers' trading strategies and their ability to identify overpriced stocks. We find that naked short sellers are contrarians who target stocks that experience positive abnormal returns. Returns following transactions that result in persistent FTDs provide no evidence that naked short sellers are informed traders. Second, we study the market's reaction to announcements indicating increased levels of naked short selling. We find that abnormal returns are generally positive following such announcements.
Introduction
Critics describe naked short selling (i.e., selling a stock short without first borrowing or arranging to borrow it) as abusive and manipulative, suggesting that naked short selling has negative consequences for the security being sold short. Consistent with this notion, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has targeted naked short selling in recent regulatory actions described as "in the public interest and for the protection of investors to maintain fair and orderly securities markets, and to prevent substantial disruption in the securities markets." 1 Despite the recent criticism of naked short sellers, little is known about their trading strategies and the market's perception of naked short selling. For example, although some speculate that naked short sellers are momentum traders who exacerbate price declines, we are aware of no rigorous empirical evidence to support such a claim. We study market returns around periods of increased naked short selling to examine the trading strategies of naked short sellers and the market's reaction to information about their trades.
Although studies of naked short selling are relatively uncommon, recent regulatory actions designed to curtail the practice have generated interest from researchers. For example, Boulton and Braga-Alves (2009) study the SEC's 2008 Emergency Order restricting naked short selling of 19 financial firms' stocks and find evidence consistent with Miller's (1977) conjecture that short sale constraints can negatively impact market efficiency by inflating prices, leading to low subsequent returns. They also find that the restrictions damaged liquidity in the stocks they 1 Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-58572/ September 17, 2008, p. 3. were designed to protect, reflected in higher trading costs and lower trading volume. In a related study, Fotak et al. (2009) find that naked short selling has a positive effect on market quality and, consistent with Boulton and Braga-Alves, report evidence that the SEC's 2008 Emergency Order had a negative effect on the price discovery process and liquidity. The authors conclude that their results stand in contrast to the negative perception of naked short selling.
One reason for the lack of research in this area is that market participants are not required to identify naked short sales, which makes them difficult to study. We proxy for naked short sale activity using failures to deliver (FTDs), which occur when a seller does not deliver securities to the buyer within the standard three-day settlement period. Beginning with Regulation SHO in 2005, each U.S. exchange is required to disseminate a daily list of securities that reach threshold levels of aggregate, open FTDs equal to, or greater than, 10,000 shares and 0.5% of the total shares outstanding for 5 consecutive settlement days. Although FTDs occur for reasons other than naked short selling, including processing errors and delays in delivering securities held in certificate form, we argue that persistent FTDs that lead to threshold listings are highly correlated with naked short selling.
We use persistent FTDs to examine stock market returns around periods of increased naked short selling with two objectives in mind. First, we conduct an event study around threshold listings to examine naked short sellers' trading strategies and their ability to identify overpriced stocks. Regulators have justified recent naked short sale restrictions by suggesting that naked short sellers are momentum traders who intensify downward price movements. If naked short sellers are momentum traders, we should expect them to target stocks that have recently experienced negative returns. We find the opposite to be true. Consistent with Angel et al. (2003) and Diether et al. (2008) , we find that naked short sellers are contrarian investors who tend to target stocks following positive abnormal returns. Depending on the criteria used to define an event, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 1.7-5.7% over the 2 trading days ending with the date of the naked short sale transaction(s) that leads to a security appearing on a threshold list (i.e., the threshold trades).
Our examination of the trading strategies of naked short sellers also includes tests of Diamond and Verrecchia's (1987) information-based explanation for elevated short selling, which predicts that short sellers are informed traders who can forecast negative returns. Contrary to studies of short selling that find support for Diamond and Verrecchia's prediction (e.g. Arnold et al., 2005; Asquith and Meulbroek, 1996; Asquith et al., 2005; Boehmer et al., 2008; and Desai et al., 2002) , we do not find that persistent FTDs indicate that stocks are overpriced. Instead, we find that stocks that experience persistent FTDs exhibit positive CARs in the period immediately following the threshold trades. For example, CARs average 1.3-1.6% over the 7 trading days between the threshold trades and the threshold list appearance. While contrary to the notion that persistent FTDs predict negative returns, this result is consistent with naked short sellers deliberately failing to deliver shares in to the face of rising share prices.
Second, we examine the stock market's reaction to announcements that firms have been added to the threshold lists, which is indicative of increased naked short selling. Theory suggests that market participants could view increased naked short selling as positive information, negative information, or uninformative. Desai et al. (2002) point to a popular notion on Wall Street that high levels of short interest is a bullish signal since short positions represent latent demand as shorts eventually must cover their positions. However, Diamond and Verrecchia's (1987) theory suggests that the costs associated with short selling increase the likelihood that short sellers are informed traders, implying that information indicating increased naked short selling is a negative signal. Consistent with this conjecture, Aitken et al. (1998) study the Australian Stock Exchange where short sale information is available in real time and find that short sales are followed by nearly instantaneous negative abnormal returns. The third possibility is that information on naked short selling does not impact stock prices. This could be the case if, for example, naked short selling is driven by hedging concerns, arbitrage trading, and tax strategies (see Senchack and Starks, 1993) . Consistent with the notion that increased naked short is a positive signal to market participants, we report average CARs of 1.3-1.9% over the 5 trading days following the announcement that a security has reached threshold levels of FTDs (i.e., a threshold event).
Our analysis contributes to the extant literature in several important ways. First, we are the first to specifically examine the trading strategies of naked short sellers. There is a wealth of information on the activities of short sellers, in general, that fails to distinguish covered short sales from naked short sales. Because a naked short seller does not have a binding lending agreement at a specific price in place at the time of the short sale, naked short selling is inherently more risky than covered short selling. This may lead to pronounced differences in the strategies of naked and covered short sellers. Second, this study advances our understanding of FTDs. Recent studies of FTDs include Boni (2006) , who finds that the probability of FTDs is a function of a stock's short interest levels, and Evans et al. (2009) , who find that failures outweigh deliveries when rebate rates are zero. Both studies suggest that FTDs are related to hard-to-borrow stocks. We are the first to document stock market returns around transactions that result in threshold levels of FTDs and public announcements that firms have reached threshold levels of FTDs. Third, our results support recent studies that suggest that the SEC's efforts to stem the recent financial crisis by preventing naked short selling may have been misguided, as we do not find that naked short sellers target stocks experiencing price weakness or that announcements indicating increased naked short selling have a negative impact on stock prices. Instead, our results are consistent with the consensus in academic research that short sales contribute positively to well-function markets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details FTDs, naked short sales, and the threshold lists while formally developing our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methodology. Section 4 reports our results on the empirical relation between naked short selling and stock prices. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Failures to deliver and hypotheses development
A failure to deliver occurs when a seller does not deliver securities to the buyer within the standard three-day settlement period. FTDs occur for a number of reasons, including processing errors, delays in delivering securities held in certificate form, and naked short selling. In a naked Although FTDs can originate for reasons other than naked short sales, several factors suggest that threshold listings are highly correlated with an increase in speculative positions established to profit from positive pricing errors. The requirements for appearing on a threshold list-aggregate, open FTDs equal to, or greater than, 10,000 shares and 0.5% of the total shares outstanding for 5 consecutive settlement days-make it unlikely that processing errors and inadvertent delivery delays are the genesis of many threshold listings. We expect that the rare instances where processing errors and delivery delays do contribute to threshold listings are random and do not systematically bias our results. Likewise, the threshold lists are unlikely to reflect naked short positions established by market makers due to a temporary order imbalance and day traders hoping to capitalize on intra-day price declines, both of which would be expected to cover their positions before FTDs meet the threshold criteria. Given that firms appear on the threshold lists only following persistent failures of a meaningful fraction of total outstanding shares, we believe that FTDs proxy for stocks targeted by naked short sellers who have established positions with the expectation of profiting from inter-day price declines. This conjecture is supported by Fotak et al. (2009) who report that the number of new FTDs is highly correlated with trading volume arising from short sales but not correlated with trading volume arising from transactions other than short sales. In Figure 1 , we provide a timeline that details the sequence of events leading to a failure to deliver, threshold status, and a security's removal from the threshold lists. Considering a firm's appearance on a threshold list as the benchmark day (day t), the naked short sale transaction(s) that pushes a firm above the threshold level of FTDs (i.e., the threshold trades) occurs on day t-7. Insight into the trading strategies of naked short sellers can be gleaned from the performance of the stocks that they target in the days leading up to day t-7. If naked short sellers are momentum traders who contribute to price declines we should expect negative returns for the stocks that they target in the period leading up to the threshold trades. Alternatively, if naked short sellers are contrarian investors who take positions in stocks they view as overpriced, we should expect positive returns for the stocks that they target in the period immediately prior to the threshold trades. This leads us to our first testable hypothesis:
H1. Naked short sellers are momentum (contrarian) investors who target stocks following negative (positive) returns.
We test the preceding hypothesis by examining CARs over the [-12, -7] and [-8, -7] windows, where day t-7 is the day of the threshold trades.
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Trades that take place on day t-7 are expected to settle on day t-4, otherwise a fail occurs.
Securities that meet or exceed threshold levels of FTDs for 5 consecutive trading days appear on the threshold lists. If fails that initially occur on day t-4 result in a security reaching threshold levels of FTDs that persist for 5 consecutive trading days, the security appears on a threshold list on day t. This implies that naked short positions can remain open for 8 days before the market is alerted through the dissemination of the threshold lists. If, as Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest, naked short sellers possess superior information that allows them to profit from subsequent price declines, we should observe negative returns in the period immediately following the threshold trades. This leads us to our second hypothesis:
H2. Naked short sellers are informed traders who profit from short positions they establish prior to price declines.
We test our second hypothesis by examining CARs over the [-6 , 0] and [-6, +13] windows, where day t-6 is the day after the threshold trades.
The market's reaction to information about the activity of naked short sellers can be observed by examining CARs after the release of the threshold lists. If, as Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest, naked short sellers are informed traders whose activities convey negative information, we should observe negative returns in the period immediately following the announcement of a stock's addition to the threshold lists. If latent demand makes increased naked short selling a bullish signal, returns should be positive following the announcement of threshold list additions. Finally if naked short selling is driven by hedging concerns, arbitrage trading, and tax strategies, the market reaction to threshold announcements should be neutral.
Our third testable hypothesis is as follows:
H3. The market views new threshold listings as negative (positive) information which is reflected in negative (positive) returns in the period following the release of the threshold lists.
The threshold lists for day t are released after the markets close, preventing investors from trading on the information contained in the lists until day t+1. We test the preceding hypothesis be examining CARs over the [+1, +5] window.
Securities are removed from the threshold lists when the aggregate level of open FTDs drops below threshold levels for 5 consecutive trading days. Therefore, day t+5 is the first day that a security can be removed from the threshold lists. Broker-dealers are required to close-out fail positions that persist for 13 consecutive trading days during which a security is on the threshold lists.
In Figure 2 , we report the daily number of securities appearing on the AMEX, Nasdaq, 
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While the typical stay on the threshold lists is about 17 days, some firms remain for an extended period. In Figure 4 , we illustrate how long firms remain on the threshold lists once they appear. Over 68% of threshold events last for 15 or fewer days, with a median of 11 days.
Extended stays are less common, with about 11% of threshold events lasting longer than 30 days.
Medis Technologies, which ended a run of 759 consecutive trading days on the Nasdaq's threshold list on August 13, 2008, is the sample stock with the longest streak on the threshold lists. The most common duration is 5 days, which corresponds to the minimum duration based on the SEC's criteria for being removed from the threshold lists. However, we do find a small number of firms with stays that last 4 or fewer days.
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Sample and methodology
Sample selection and event identification
We use the threshold lists provided by the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE to identify our sample events. 
Methodology
We follow Christophe et al. (2007) and report abnormal returns in all our tests. We measure abnormal returns using the market model as our benchmark (Brown and Warner, 1985) .
The model is 6 Unreported tests indicate that the results are robust to alternative definitions of a sustained absence from the threshold lists and to higher minimum share prices.
where R jt is the return on the j th stock on day t and R mt is the return on the market index on day t. β j measures a stock's sensitivity to the market risk factor. Daily abnormal returns are measured for common stock j on day t as ) (
where j ˆand j ˆ are the ordinary least squares estimates from equation (1). We estimate equation (1) over the 255 trading days ending at least 46 days before the event and calculate abnormal returns for each stock with equation (2). We use the CRSP equally weighted portfolio to proxy for the market index.
Empirical results
The focus of our event study analysis is twofold. First, we study naked short sellers' behavior for insight into their trading strategies and their ability to identify overpriced stocks.
We find that naked short sellers are contrarians who trade following positive abnormal returns.
Our examination of persistent FTDs provides no evidence that naked short sellers are informed traders who profit from subsequent negative abnormal returns. Second, we study the market's reaction to announcements indicating increased levels of naked short selling. We find abnormal returns are generally positive following such announcements.
Threshold event abnormal returns
In Table 2 , we report abnormal returns around threshold events. In Panel A, we report daily abnormal returns over the [-12, +13] window where day zero is the day a stock appears on an exchange's threshold list. Our window begins 5 trading days before the threshold trades, which allows us to study the stock market performance of the firms targeted by naked short sellers, and ends with the mandatory close-out date, which enables us to examine stock market performance subsequent to the threshold trades and around the announcement that a stock has been added to the threshold lists. We report results for four threshold event definitions. In the first column of results, threshold events are the first-time a security appears on the threshold lists.
In subsequent columns we report the results for securities reappearing on the threshold lists after an absence of at least 30-, 90-, and 180-days, respectively.
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In Table 2 , Panel A, we find that mean daily abnormal returns tend to be positive and statistically significant around threshold events. Using first time threshold listings as the benchmark for discussion, we find that abnormal returns are significant around the day of the threshold trades (t-7) and the event day (t). A large positive abnormal return of 1.56% is observed on the day of the threshold trades (t-7). While not consistent with the notion that naked short sellers are momentum traders, this result is consistent with Angel et al. (2003) and Diether et al. (2008) , who find evidence that short sellers are contrarian investors who target stocks that recently experienced positive returns.
Because the daily threshold lists are released after the close of trading on day t, the market cannot act on the new information contained in the lists until the following trading day.
Perhaps our most interesting finding is that abnormal returns are positive and both statistically and economically significant for the two trading days following a threshold event. For example, we report that stocks appearing on the threshold lists for the first time experience average abnormal returns of 0.4% on day t+1 and 0.5% on day t+2. This is consistent with the notion that increased naked short selling is a bullish signal because it represents latent demand for the stock being shorted. The 30-, 90-, and 180-day samples lead to similar inferences.
In Table 2 , Panel B, we report CARs over several windows around threshold events.
Return windows ending on the day of the threshold trades (t-7) continue to support the notion that naked short sellers are contrarian investors who target stocks that have recently experienced positive returns. Two-day CARs ending on the day of the threshold trades average 1.72-5.66%
for first-time threshold listings. We report positive CARs over the [-6, 0] window, which corresponds to the period between the threshold trades and the day the firm appears on a threshold list. This indicates that naked short sellers are generally not able to profitably close out their short positions before a stock appears on the threshold lists and suggests that short sellers may choose not to deliver in the face of rising prices. On the other hand, it is contrary to the notion that naked short sellers are informed traders. CARs are positive over the five days following a security's appearance on the threshold lists, suggesting that market participants do not view the news that a security has reached threshold levels negatively. Finally, we report CARs of 2.79-4.31% over the [-6, +13] period, which begins on the day after the threshold trades and ends on the mandatory close out day. This suggests that the stocks target by naked short sellers outperform the market over an extended period following the threshold trades, which is the opposite of what we should expect if naked short sellers possessed superior information that allowed them to profit from subsequent price declines.
Our Table 2 results for naked short sellers complement Angel et al. (2003) and Diether et al. (2008) who find that short sellers tend to transact following positive returns. This is consistent with the notion that short sellers promote efficient markets by providing liquidity in up markets, risk-bearing, and selling stocks they view as overpriced and contrary to the claim that naked short sellers are momentum investors who exacerbate downward price momentum. Our results for naked short sellers are not consistent with studies, including Arnold et al. (2005) , Asquith and Meulbroek (1996) , Asquith et al. (2005) , and Desai et al. (2002) , that conclude that short sellers are informed. Instead, we find that threshold stocks outperform expectations following threshold trades and the public dissemination of threshold information. Also, consistent with naked short selling representing a bullish signal due to latent demand, we find that market participants tend to react positively when stocks appear on the threshold lists.
Cumulative abnormal returns by year
Naked short sellers have been blamed, at least in part, for the crisis that gripped financial markets in 2008. To explore the possibility that naked short sellers' trading strategies and the market's reaction to threshold events is not consistent across our sample period, we report CARs around threshold events on a year-by-year basis in Table 3 . We find that the positive CARs reported for the full sample for the period before the threshold trades are larger in the earlier years of our sample. For first time threshold listings, the average CAR over the interval [-8, -7] is 4.02% (1.99%) for events taking place in 2006 (2007) . This compares to a two-day CAR of -0.42% in 2008, a year characterized by extreme volatility and severe stock price declines. This suggests that naked short sellers' contrarian tendencies diminished over our sample period.
CARs measured over the longer [-12, -7] event window also suggest that naked short sellers These results support earlier evidence that suggests that market participants do not view threshold events as negative information but instead view increased naked short selling as a bullish signal because of the latent demand created by short sellers' eventual need to cover their trades. This result is particularly evident in 2008, a year when naked short sellers saw their activities constrained by market regulators while many in the media vilified their trades as abusive and manipulative. Overall, the results reported in Table 3 provide little support for the contention that naked short selling exacerbated price declines during the recent financial crisis and instead suggest that the actions of market regulators to constrain the activities of naked short sellers may have been misguided.
Cumulative abnormal returns by listing exchange
In Table 4 , we explore the possibility that threshold events differ by listing exchange.
Differences may be due to factors such as the characteristics of the firms traded on different exchanges, market structure, and the market maker exemption to naked short sale regulations.
We continue to report the results for four threshold event definitions.
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In Table 4 , we find that the positive CARs in the period before the threshold trades are generally strongest for Nasdaq-listed stocks. CARs over the interval [-8, -7] are consistently statistically significant only for Nasdaq-listed stocks reappearing on the threshold lists after 30-, 90-, and 180-day absences. For example, we report CARs of 3.85%, 1.58%, and 0.46%, respectively, for Nasdaq-, AMEX-, and NYSE-listed stocks reappearing on the threshold lists after an absence of at least 30-days. The exception is the sample of stocks making their first appearance on the threshold lists. The average CAR for first-time listings over the interval [-8, - 7] is 3.81% for stocks trading on the AMEX, 2.36% for stocks trading on the Nasdaq, and -
1.14% for NYSE-listed firms.
The CARs reported for the period between the threshold trades and the threshold listing are generally positive regardless of listing exchange. For example, CARs over the interval [-6, 0] are 1.26%, 1.43%, and 1.21%, respectively, for AMEX-, Nasdaq-, and NYSE-listed stocks making their first appearance on the threshold lists. This confirms earlier evidence that suggests that naked short sellers are typically not able to profitably unwind their position before a stock appears on the threshold lists.
We also report abnormal returns following threshold events by listing exchange. In contrast to the [-8, -7] results, CARs following threshold appearances tend to be larger for NYSE-listings than for firms listed on the AMEX and Nasdaq. For example, we report an average CARs over the period [+1, +5] of 3.29% for NYSE-listed stocks making their first appearance on the threshold lists. This compares to average CARs of 1.28% and 0.93% for AMEX-and Nadaq-listed stocks, respectively. The results are similar for firms reappearing on the threshold lists after an extended absence.
Cumulative abnormal returns by threshold absence
In Table 5 , we address the possibility that the information content of threshold events is related to the length of time since a firm last appeared on a threshold list. We divide the events for the 30-, 90-, and 180-day threshold event definitions into quartiles based on the number of days elapsed since a firm previously appeared on a threshold list. Quartile 4 contains the firms reappearing on the threshold lists following the longest absences, while quartile 1 contains the firms reappearing after shorter absences. For example, when threshold events are based on a minimum absence of 30 days, the quartile cutoffs are 251, 112, and 57 days, respectively.
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Focusing on the 30-day definition for threshold events, we find that CARs in the period before the threshold trades are positively correlated with the length of a firm's absence from the threshold lists. We report CARs of 4.82% over the interval [-8, -7] for stocks absent from the threshold lists for at least 251 days compared to CARs of 1.25% over the same period for stocks absent for 51 or fewer days (p-value of the difference = 0.01). However, this pattern is not evident for the 90-and 180-day subsamples. For these subsamples there is no consistent relation between CARs and a stock's absence from the threshold lists. The remaining event windows
provide little evidence of a relation between CARs and the length of time between a stock's appearances on the threshold lists.
Cumulative abnormal returns by market capitalization
D'Avolio (2002) examines the market for borrowing and lending stocks and finds that the shares of larger firms are more readily available for borrowing by short sellers, mainly because institutions, who represent a significant fraction of stock lending, favor large firms. In Table 6 , we examine the possibility that the information content of threshold events is related to the market capitalization of stocks appearing on the threshold lists by separating our sample into quartiles based on market value of equity. In Table 1 , we reported that the market capitalization of first time threshold listings is noticeably larger than firms reappearing on the threshold lists.
The quartile cutoffs for first time listings are $666 million, $261 million, and $106 million, while for firms reappearing after a 30-day absence they are $395 million, $180 million, and $78 million. The cutoffs for firms reappearing after 90 and 180 days are similar to the 30 day cutoffs.
We find that CARs over the interval [-8, -7] are largest for the quartile containing the smallest firms. For the first time threshold listings, the average CAR for stocks in the largest (smallest) market cap is -0.47% (6.77%). When we define a threshold event as a reappearance after an absence of at least 30 days, the CARs for the largest and smallest quartiles are 0.91% and 6.86%, respectively. In contrast to the [-8, -7 ] results, we find that CARs over the [-6, 0] window tend not to be significant for firms in the smallest market capitalization quartile while there is very little difference in returns for the three largest market capitalization quartile. The relation between size and CARs in periods following the announcement that a stock is on the threshold lists is unremarkable.
Multivariate analysis of cumulative abnormal returns
In Table 7 , we report the results of ordinary least squares regressions that control for several of factors that might impact CARs around threshold events. The sample includes all first time threshold listings and all repeat threshold listings that follow an absence of at least 30 days.
The dependent variable in the regressions is the CAR over several windows before and after the threshold event. To control for the possibility that CARs are related to the length of a stock's absence from the threshold lists, our model includes the natural log of 1 plus the number of days since a firm last appeared on the threshold lists and an indicator variable set to 1 for first time threshold events, and zero otherwise. Ackert and Athanassakos (2005) report a relation between firm size and returns around short sale transactions. Thus, we control for firm size by including the natural log of the firm's market capitalization. The inverse of the stock price is included to account for the possibility that naked short sellers trading strategies or that the market's response to information related to naked short selling is related to a firm's stock price. We include controls for the standard deviation of daily returns and turnover (trading volume divided by shares outstanding), measured over the 22 trading days ending the day before the naked short sale transaction(s) that result in a threshold listing (t-8). Finally, indicator variables are set to 1 for firms operating in a high tech industry, Nasdaq-listed stocks, and threshold events that take place during the bear market of 2008, and zero otherwise.
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The first two results columns in Table 7 consider CARs for periods leading up to and including the day of the threshold trades. We find that CARs are larger for firms reappearing on the threshold lists after an extended absence, first time threshold list appearances, higher priced stocks, stocks with more volatile returns, and stocks with lower turnover. Consistent with Table   3 , we find that CARs are 3.1-4.2 percentage points lower for events taking place in 2008. This suggests that naked short sellers' tendency to trade stocks experiencing recent positive CARs was diminished during the bear market of 2008. However, as detailed earlier, we find little evidence to suggest that naked short sellers tend to transact following periods of price weakness during any of our sample years.
In the third results column we examine CARs for the period [-6, 0] , which begins the day after the threshold trades and extends to the day of the threshold appearance. CARs measured over this period tend to be positively related to market capitalization, stock price, and the standard deviation of returns and negatively related to turnover. The forth column reports the results for CARs for the period [+1, +5]. We find that CARs over this period are generally 2.8 percentage points larger for first time threshold listings and 1.2 percentage points larger for events taking place in 2008.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we study naked short sellers' behavior for insight into their trading strategies and their ability to identify overpriced stocks. We find that naked short sellers are contrarians who trade following positive abnormal returns. We find no evidence that naked short sellers are informed traders who profit from subsequent negative abnormal returns. Second, we study the market's reaction to announcements indicating increased levels of naked short selling. We find abnormal returns are generally positive following such announcements.
Our results suggest that the SEC's recent regulatory actions restricting naked short selling may have been misplaced, as we find no evidence that naked short sellers are informed traders who exacerbate downward price momentum or are negatively viewed by the market. Instead, our results complement studies that suggest that naked short sellers promote efficient markets by providing liquidity in up markets, risk-bearing, and selling stocks they view as overpriced. -12, -7] and [-8, -7] ), the period between threshold trades and the threshold event ([-6, 0] ), and the period following the public release of threshold information ([+1, +5] ). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 7 Multivariate analysis of cumulative abnormal returns This table presents ordinarly least squares regressions of cumulative abnormal returns around threshold events. Threshold events are defined as either a first time appearances on the threshold lists or a reappearance after an absences of at least 30 days. Absence since last event is the natural log of 1 plus the the number of days since a firms last appeared on the threshold lists. First time threshold event is a dummy variable set to 1 for events that represent a firm's first appearance on the threshold lists, and zero otherwise. Market capitalization (natural log) and (inverse) stock price are measured as of the event date. The standard deviation of returns is the standard deviation of daily returns over the 22 days beginning 8 days before the event. Turnover is the average of the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding over the 22 days beginning 8 days before the event. High tech is a dummy variable set to 1 for firms with SIC codes identified as high tech industries by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) , and zero otherwise. Nasdaq listed is a dummy variable set to 1 for firms listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange, and zero otherwise. 
